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ABSTRACT 
 
The economic efficiency of current and alternative 
ground water policies for Dutch agriculture and their 
impact on the adoption of modern irrigation technology 
have been investigated. The study shows that the 
current system of historical ground water extraction 
rights and sprinkling bans is inefficient and provides 
fewer incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation 
technology than does a system that considers 
externalities in the price of water or diverts water away 
from agriculture while encouraging trading. These 
inefficiencies may result in low-value use of ground 
water and the use of traditional irrigation technologies, 
which may cause desiccation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Policy instruments for ground water allocation such as 
tradable extraction rights, sprinkling bans, and ground 
water extraction charges determine both the economic 
efficiency of ground water use and the distribution of 
ground water among users. They can “queue” users and 
restrict or encourage the transfer and trading of water 
and adoption of water saving technologies. The current 
ground water extraction rights system together with the 
low ground water prices encourage low-value 
agricultural ground water usage in The Netherlands. 
Extraction can result in desiccation of nature areas. 
Sprinkling bans in periods of serious drought and 
irrigation scheduling currently aim to reduce low-value 
use of ground water, but it is not clear whether these 
measures are efficient and whether they provide 
incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation 
technology.  
 
Economic literature on mechanisms to allocate ground 
water in The Netherlands has been limited, especially 
with respect to agriculture. Wiersma (1998) investigated 
a more efficient ground water allocation procedure based 
on regional auctions for Dutch ground water extraction 
permits. He does not consider agricultural extractions in 
his analysis, because they are only temporary and will 
be reduced by sprinkling bans. There is, however, 
extensive literature available (e.g. Michelson & Young 
1993; Dinar & Wolf 1994; Strosser, 1997) on the role of 
ground water allocation mechanisms in other countries.  
 
In this paper we will investigate whether current and 
alternative mechanisms allocate ground water efficiently 
and whether they provide incentives for the adoption of 
modern irrigation technology.  We addressed the 
following research questions: 
 
1. Do current ground water policies allocate ground 
water efficiently in The Netherlands? 
2. What kind of alternative policies can be used to 
achieve a more efficient allocation?  
3. Do these policies provide incentives for the 
adoption of  modern irrigation technology? 
 
To answer these questions, Dutch ground water 
management problems and economic efficiency 
concepts are explained in more detail in Section 2. 
Section 3 studies the economic efficiency of current 
ground water policies. Section 4 studies the economic 
efficiency of alternative ground water policies. Finally, 
Section 5 contains the discussion and conclusions. 
 
ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY AND RELATED DUTCH 
WATER PROBLEMS  
 
In The Netherlands, current ground water policies 
encourage both low-value agricultural ground water use, 
like the sprinkling of grasslands, and the use of 
traditional irrigation technologies with a low irrigation 
effectiveness. Extraction may reduce temporarily and 
locally the availability of water for environmental 
amenities. Plant species adapted to wet and moist 
environments disappear due to a lack of soil moisture. 
As a result biodiversity will decline. So, extraction may 
cause externalities. Private behaviour is inefficient from a 
social point of view in the presence of externalities that 
are not taken into account. Therefore we will evaluate 
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the efficiency of various ground water policies. Two 
kinds of criteria to evaluate efficiency can be 
distinguished; allocative and technical efficiency 
(Perman et al., 1999):  
 
· Allocative efficiency requires the marginal value of 
water to be the same for the last unit of water 
consumed by each user and equal to the marginal 
cost of supplying water. Transactions are interesting 
when differences exist between the marginal value of 
water for different uses.  
 
· Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio between 
output and inputs. Technical efficiency can be 
improved by adoption of modern water saving 
technologies, which produce the same output with 
less inputs. Allocation mechanisms, which establish 
a higher water price provide incentives for the 
adoption of modern irrigation technology (Zilberman 
and Lipper, 1999). 
 
CURRENT GROUND WATER POLICIES 
 
In this section we will show that current ground water 
policies are in many situations inefficient. Alternative 
policies to improve the economic efficiency will be 
discussed in Section 4. Table 1 shows whether current 
(row 3a until row 3d) and alternative (row 4a until row 
4e) policies achieve the socially optimal water price, an 
efficient allocation, and provide incentives for the 
adoption of modern irrigation technology; i.e. improve 
the technical efficiency. It also shows prerequisites for 
policy instruments to be effective.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of the characteristics of various ground water policies 
 
The value of the marginal 
product is equal among all 
Instrument Socially 
optimal 
water 
price  
users  farm 
land 
land at 
the farm 
Incentives 
for adoption 
of modern 
technology  
Prerequisites for policy 
instruments to be 
effective 
Current policies       
3a Current price of water use N N Y Y N  
3b Current extraction rights N N Y Y N  
3c Current sprinkling bans N N N N Y Penalties 
3d Irrigation scheduling N N N N Y Adoption 
Alternative policies       
4a Water pricing reform Y Y Y Y Y Negative price elasticity 
4b (non)tradable extraction rights: 
Quota: -proportion current use 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
            -per crop N Y Y Y Y 
 
Penalties, efficient 
assignment of quota 
Markets:-without restriction on use N N Y Y N 
              -with restrictions on use Y Y Y Y Y 
Efficiency gains have to 
exceed transaction cost 
4c Fine-tuned sprinkling bans N Y Y Y Y Penalties, fine-tuning 
4d Persuasion  N N N N Y No myopic behaviour 
4e Subsidy: -proportion current use N Y N Y N 
                    -per crop N Y Y Y N 
Participation in subsidy 
schemes 
 
 
 
1) Y means that the price is equal to the socially optimal water price or that the value of the marginal product of 
water is equal among all users or farmland or land at the farm or that incentives exist for the adoption of 
modern irrigation technology; N means that this is not the case 
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3a) Current Price of Water Use 
 
Since it was introduced in January 1995, Dutch ground 
water extraction is subject to a charge of € 0.08 per m3 (to 
be increased to € 0.15 per m3), but the current charge is 
restricted to farmers withdrawing more than 30,000 m3 of 
ground water per annum. Only a small percentage of 
farmers (about 1 to 2 percent) exceed this charge-free 
threshold, and are subject to this charge (Staalduinen et 
al. 1996). Most farmers currently only pay the energy 
costs of lifting water from the stock to the field (i.e. 
about € 0.04 per m3
 
).  
 
The current pricing system of water implies that 
externalities, which arise due to agricultural ground 
water extraction, are not yet fully internalised in the price 
of applied water. Marginal values of the last unit of 
ground water applied are not equal among users, since 
farmers maximise individual (instead of social) current 
(instead of future) profit each period. In the absence of 
sprinkling bans, it seems reasonable to assume that they 
pump water until its marginal net benefit is zero. The 
value of the marginal product is therefore equal among 
all farmland irrigated. Such a low water price does not 
provide incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation 
technology (see row 3a in Table 1). 
 
 
3b) Current Extraction Rights 
 
 
In The Netherlands, ground water extraction is currently 
determined by free extraction licences granted by local 
authorities (provinces) in the past. These licences can 
be considered as historical extraction rights (“grand-
fathering rules”). An extraction right was only refused 
when the extraction could damage other users, while 
damage of extraction to ecosystems was until very 
recently not taken into account. Under such a ground 
water extraction rights system nature is jeopardised, 
since it encourages agricultural ground water extraction.  
 
The current ground water extraction rights system is not 
efficient, since current allocation rules are based on a 
“queuing” system that restricts the transfer and trading 
of water rights.  The water price which is equal to the 
extraction costs, will be below the socially optimal water 
price, which provides fewer incentives for the adoption 
of modern irrigation technology. Current allocation rules 
“queue” in particular users who are interested in the 
maintenance of stream flows like nature.  Marginal 
values of the last unit of ground water applied are not 
equal among users  (see  row  3b in Table 1). 
3c) Current Sprinkling Bans  
 
Low-value agricultural use of ground water by 
agriculture is currently reduced by imposing sprinkling 
bans, diverting water away from current agricultural use 
to non-agricultural and/or future use. These bans differ 
per province and vary with respect to the source of 
water used (ground water versus surface water), crop 
grown (grass versus arable), soil type (sandy versus 
clay), and time period (part of the year and day). Bans 
especially aim to reduce ground water use for sprinkling 
of grass on sandy soils in areas sensitive to desiccation 
during dry periods.  
 
Current bans are only rough restrictions and are not 
efficient. There are for instance no arable crop-specific 
sprinkling bans, while marginal values of water vary 
among arable crops. If bans reduce current ground water 
usage, they will increase the shadow price, which will 
provide incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation 
technology (see row 3c in Table 1).  
 
3d) Irrigation Scheduling  
 
In response to the resistance the bans raised, a 
management tool for irrigation scheduling was 
developed and tested in 1995, often referred to as the 
irrigation planner. It gives farmers a better insight into 
the moisture regime of their plots, the best timing to start 
irrigation and the best water dose, and prevents over-
irrigation and thus increases the irrigation effectiveness. 
It does not only have a water-saving effect but also has 
a variable cost-saving effect with respect to extraction 
cost. The irrigation planner is a disembodied 
innovation, which means that it is not embodied in a 
physical item. It is practical knowledge that can be 
shared by many users. It is an unshielded innovation, 
since the ability of private firms to appropriate some of 
the benefits associated with the use of it is limited 
(Sunding & Zilberman, 1999). The development of the 
irrigation planner was therefore a public funded R&D 
effort.  
 
If irrigation scheduling is adopted, it will improve the 
technical efficiency. The water price will, however, still 
be below the socially optimal water price. The value of 
the marginal product will not be equal among land at the 
farm, since the irrigation planner gives only rough 
indications to reduce usage (see row 3d in Table 1). 
 
Alternative Ground Water Policies 
 
In Section 3 it became clear that current ground water 
policies are indeed inefficient. The efficiency of new 
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options and their impact on the adoption of modern 
irrigation technology are studied in this section. We 
discuss the pros and cons of 1) three economic 
instruments, water pricing reform, agricultural water 
markets and subsidies; 2) two command and control 
based instruments, quota and fine-tuned bans; and 3) a 
social instrument, persuasion.  
 
4a) Water Pricing Reform 
 
The extent of divergence between the private and social 
price of water, represents the optimal volumetric charge 
that induces the individual farmer to behave in the 
socially optimal way. Not only extraction costs but also 
environmental and resource costs have to be considered 
in the socially optimal price of water. This increases the 
price of water and consequently creates incentives for 
the adoption of modern irrigation technology (see row 
4a in Table 1). 
 
The theoretical framework of efficient water-pricing 
schemes is clear, but there are some problems. Firstly, it 
is hard to determine the level of charges, since monetary 
values have to be attached to the damage due to 
excessive use of ground water, whereas perpetrators of 
externalities usually evaluate damage less severely than 
other interest groups. Secondly, water pricing schemes 
often ignore information needed for implementation. 
Implementation problems are linked to enforcement, 
monitoring, institutional limitations, conflicting policies, 
and welfare implications. Thirdly, the introduction of 
price reform is conditional upon the size of the social 
gains relative to the transaction costs. Additional costs 
will be low, because only the charge-free threshold has 
to be reduced under the current ground water tax 
system. Finally, water-pricing reform only has a positive 
influence on water conservation if the price elasticity of 
water demand is significantly different from zero and is 
negative. Agricultural water demand is usually inelastic 
only up to a given price level (Garrido, 1999).  This “price 
threshold” depends on the productivity of water, the set 
of alternative production strategies, the proportion of 
land devoted to permanently-irrigated crops, and the 
irrigation technologies.  
 
4b) (Non)tradable Extraction Rights: 
 
Ground Water Extraction Quota  
 
Ground water extraction rights have to be divided among 
farmers with the intention to allocate a restricted amount 
of supply in a most efficient and equitable way, which is 
not easy to establish. Quotas can be assigned in 
proportion to ground water extraction by each farmer in 
a certain base period. In that case the marginal value of 
the last unit of water applied becomes equal among land 
at the farm, but not among all farmland. Alternatively, 
quotas can be assigned per crop in such a way that the 
marginal value of the last unit of water applied becomes 
equal among all farmland, which is more efficient. The 
first assignment seems to be more socially equitable, 
because the latter assignment will target some farms, 
mainly with low-value use, more seriously than others. 
Economists provide, however, only insight into 
alternative allocations of rents. Policy makers have to 
judge whether this is socially equitable. The shadow 
price of agricultural ground water use will increase if 
ground water is diverted away from current agricultural 
use to non-agricultural and/or future use by means of a 
quota, which will provide incentives for the adoption of 
modern irrigation technology. Adequate penalties have 
to be imposed, which involves monitoring and control 
costs.  
 
Agricultural Ground Water Extraction Rights Markets 
 
The efficiency gains of agriculture associated with the 
transition from “queuing” systems to agricultural 
extraction rights markets result from an increase in the 
area of land that the amount of ground water available 
for agriculture can serve (Zilberman et al., 1994). Moving 
water that has a relatively low marginal productivity to 
land that has not been irrigated before increases water 
productivity (Shah & Zilberman, 1992). Because water 
availability per hectare is currently relatively large on all 
farmland on which irrigation is desirable in The 
Netherlands (although not during all seasons), transition 
to agricultural extraction rights markets is less 
interesting. Efficiency gains will be small relative to the 
transaction costs. Agricultural extraction rights markets 
will become more interesting if agricultural water 
availability is restricted to the socially optimal level. 
Transition to agricultural water markets while diverting 
water away from current agricultural use may decrease 
agricultural sector’s well-being to some extent, but is 
desirable from a social point of view. A possible 
efficiency gain of agriculture is associated with the 
adoption of modern technologies, which result  from 
incentives created by higher water prices established 
under agricultural water rights markets.  
 
An equitable introduction of water markets is hard to 
establish. Rights can, for instance, be auctioned off so 
that the authorities reap all the rent from new 
entitlements. An alternative is to allow senior rights 
owners to sell their water to buyers and benefit from the 
revenues of the sales. It is important to avoid transfers 
of extraction rights to regions sensitive to desiccation. 
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4c) Fine-Tuned Bans 
 
If bans are fine-tuned to resource, region, soil, crop, and 
time specific circumstances and set to achieve the 
socially optimal agricultural ground water use level, they 
will allocate water  efficiently. Such bans increase the 
shadow price, which provides incentives for the 
adoption of modern irrigation technology. There is a 
high demand for technical knowledge to fine-tune the 
bans. Nevertheless, they are suitable to restrict 
extraction under specific circumstances. Transaction 
costs will be low; it is only a refinement of current bans 
(see row 4c in Table 1). 
 
4d) Persuasion to Adopt Irrigation Scheduling  
 
It is not likely that farmers will adopt irrigation 
scheduling under the low water prices they currently 
face. Motives for adoption of the irrigation planner are 
saving in costs, government-supported incentives, and 
persuasion. Motives for not using it are the investment 
costs that it entails, its complexity and the effort that its 
use will require. Practical test results showed that indeed 
only a small group of farmers would start using the 
irrigation planner of their own accord (Boland et al., 
1996). Farmers are therefore subsidised and extension 
and education activities were started to encourage 
adoption. Besides, farmers were persuaded that bans 
would be abolished in the region, if a certain diffusion 
rate was met, i.e. if a certain number of farmers adopted 
the irrigation planner. Those who do not adopt also 
benefit from abolition. They can be considered as “free 
riders.” It is hard to persuade farmers that extraction has 
a negative impact, because they often behave myopic 
(see row 4d in Table 1).  
 
4e) Subsidies to Reduce Agricultural Water Use  
 
Subsidies can be provided to reduce ground water use 
to the socially optimal application level. A reduction in 
extraction is, however, not guaranteed, since 
participation is often voluntary. Besides, no increase in 
the water price will be established. Various possibilities 
to integrate water subsidies in Common Agricultural 
Policies are described below: 
 
· An option is to design agri-environmental 
programmes under regulation 2078/92, that can be 
used to compensate farmers for the damage due to a 
reduction in ground water extraction; for instance, 
wetland recovery like in Spain (Varela & Sumpsi, 
1999). Payments can be based on proportional 
reductions of current extraction or on crop specific 
reductions.  
· Another option is to attach environmental conditions 
like less ground water extraction to direct income 
payments and to withhold payments to farmers who 
do not fulfil environmental conditions like defined in 
the Codes of Good Agricultural Practice; i.e. to use 
the instrument of cross-compliance. No additional 
subsidy is received. Money saved can be re-
allocated to increase agri-environmental programmes 
for the protection of ground water resources. 
 
· Finally, farmers and nature conservationists can 
make commitments on the use of ground water in a 
voluntary agreement and negotiate about 
compensation payments.  
 
DISCUSSION  
 
This study shows that current policies do indeed 
allocate ground water inefficiently in The Netherlands. 
We found that the current system of water prices, 
extraction rights, sprinkling bans, and irrigation 
scheduling did not equalise the value of the marginal 
product of water among all users and that nature may 
consequently be desiccated.  
 
The study also shows that various alternative 
mechanisms can be used to achieve a more efficient 
allocation of ground water, but that each has its own 
prerequisites which have to be fulfilled. Whether the 
command and control based instruments studied here 
will allocate ground water efficiently depends on the 
penalties imposed, the way quotas are assigned, and the 
way bans are fine-tuned. Economic instruments like 
subsidies and pricing reforms will only reduce usage if 
farmers participate in subsidy schemes and if the price 
elasticity of water demand is negative. The theoretical 
framework of efficient water pricing is clear, but there are 
implementation problems. Persuasion only works if 
farmers do not behave myopically. Introduction of 
instruments is conditional upon the size of the social 
gains relative to the transaction costs. The high 
transaction costs of agricultural water markets are 
especially a problem when water availability per hectare 
for irrigation is large, which is currently the case in The 
Netherlands. In that case there will be efficiency gains if 
availability is restricted.  
 
Allocation mechanisms that increase the price or 
shadow price of water provide incentives for the 
adoption of modern irrigation technology; i.e. improve 
the technical efficiency. We found that volumetric 
charges and water markets with a restriction on usage 
increased the water price, while quotas and sprinkling 
bans increased the shadow price of water and therefore 
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create incentives for the adoption of modern irrigation 
technology. Since current water prices only reflect 
extraction costs under current extraction rights, they do 
not create incentives for the adoption of modern 
irrigation technology. 
 
We should be careful with exceptions when allocation 
mechanisms are being designed as illustrated by the 
charge-free threshold for agricultural ground water 
extraction, which is only exceeded by a small percentage 
of farmers. This charge on ground water extraction is not 
a very effective policy instrument to reduce low-value 
agricultural ground water extraction.  
In this paper various ground water policies are 
discussed separately, whereas they can be combined in 
such a way that they reinforce each other. The irrigation 
planner, for instance, seems to be a very useful 
instrument in combination with other instruments. An 
empirical analysis can provide insight into the optimal 
instrument mix. 
 
According to the farmers irrigation of grassland is not a 
low-value application, because benefits other than 
changes in output should be calculated as well. If soils 
are very sensitive to drought, irrigation may be essential 
for good farm management to avoid a long recovery 
period of the crop due to drought damage to the roots. 
Besides, irrigation leads to better mineral utilisation, 
which is beneficial to the environment.  
 
The study shows that the current system of historical 
ground water extraction rights and sprinkling bans is 
inefficient and provides fewer incentives for the adoption 
of modern irrigation technology than does a system that 
considers externalities in the price of water or diverts 
water away from agriculture while encouraging trading.  
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